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Book Review
Green and Global: A Review of Trading Up:
Consumer andEnvironmentalRegulations in a
GlobalEconomy, David Vogel, Harvard University
Press, 1995, pp. 322; Greening the GATT: Trade,
Environment, and the Future,Daniel C. Esty,

Institute for International Economics, 1994, pp. 319;
FinancingChange: The FinancialCommunity, EcoEfficiency, andSustainableDevelopment, Stephan
Schmidheiny and Federico J.L. Zorraquin with the
World Business Council on Sustainable
Development, The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 211.
REVIEWED BY ASEEM PRAKASH*

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: AN OVERVIEW

There is much talk that the globalization of the world economy will
drastically alter the current systems of governance. The increasing power of
multinational corporations (MNCs) will render governments ineffective in
MNCs will pit one
enforcing labor and environmental regulations.
government against another leading to a race-to-the-bottom. Others argue that
globalization is a myth; the world has always had extensive economic
linkages. Globalization may not erode State power but may merely rechannel
it. Governments will shed old functions and embrace new ones.
Without getting entangled in the debates over the etiology and impact of
globalization, I focus on how economic globalization (independent variable)
may or may not create incentives for firms to adopt environmentally
sustainable policies (dependent variable). I discuss two broad themes. First,

* Assistant Professor of Strategic Management and Public Policy, School of Business and Public
Management, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. The author wishes to thank Yu-che
Chen and Ray Eliason for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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do globalization and free trade/investment regimes create incentives for MNCs
to relocate in countries with the least stringent environmental regulations, the
so-called pollution-havens? If so, then the question arises whether the tradeenvironment conflict can be resolved at all and whether the new international
organizations are up to this task. Second, do financial markets create
incentives for firms to adopt policies which only meet (but do not exceed) the
requirements of laws? If so, is reforming financial markets a prerequisite for
moving towards environmental sustainability?
It is important to recognize that firms' adoption of "green policies" is only
step toward environmental sustainability since non-firm actors are
initial
an
Environmental
significant contributors to environmental degradation.
aspects
sociocultural
including
concept
broader
a
much
is
also
sustainability
of human existence, and for some scholars, reflecting preferences/interest of
non-human species as well.'
In this essay, I treat globalization as being synonymous with the increasing
integration of input, factor, and final product markets across countries. This
results in economic actors treating the whole globe or a group of countries,
rather than a particular country, as their unit of economic decisionmaking. The
two distinctive features of globalization are: (a) the increased salience of
MNCs in economic activity; and (b) the internationalization of financial
markets and their unprecedented influence on allocation of resources within
and across firms.
MNCs are firms undertaking value-addition activities in foreign countries
and internalizing intermediate product markets across countries.' Though
scholars often treat foreign direct investment (FDI) as a proxy for MNC
activity, transnationalization of production manifests in forms such as
licensing and franchising, for example. The World Investment Report notes
that:
[Firms] undertake and organize international production
employing a wide variety of modalities of international
transactions, including FDI; cross-border intra-firm trade;

i. Thomas N. Gladwin, The Meaning of Greening:

A Plea for Organizational Theory, in

ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 37 (Kurt Fisher & Johan Schot eds., 1992).
2. For a conceptual discussion on why MNCs exist at all, see RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1996); JOHN H. DENNING, THE GLOBALIZATION OF BUSINESS

(1993); James R. Markusen, The Boundaries of MultinationalEnterprise and the Theory of International
Trade, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 169 (1995).
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cooperative inter-firm agreements (such as strategic
alliances); non-equity forms of TNC involvement (e.g.,
licensing, turnkey agreements, franchising, management
contracts); and subcontracting. . . . The important thing is
that, in their totality, these various modalities are not only
used to access international markets for outputs, but also to
access international markets for inputs .... 3
How extensive is the transnationalization of production and how
important are MNCs in global economic activity? Consider the following
trends:
The internationalization of production has reached an
unprecedented level with the FDI stock at $2.6 trillion
(1995);
Global sales of foreign affiliates of MNCs stand at $5.2
trillion (1992), exceeding arm's length trade of $3 trillion
(1992);
108 of the 110 legislative changes made in 49 countries
4
liberalized rules governing FDI (1994);
One-third of the arm's length trade takes place on an
intrafirm basis.'
Globalization is often associated with internationalization of financial
markets.6 It is important to distinguish financial markets from monetary
systems. Stopford and Strange note that:

3. U.N. CONF. TRADE& DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1995; TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND COMPETITIVENESS, at 36, Sales No. E.95.11.A.9 (1995); see also DEANNE JULIUS, GLOBAL COMPANIES
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990).

4.
5.

U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., supranote 3, at xx.
EDWARD M. GRAHAM, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L ECON., GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL

GOVERNMENTS 14 (1996).
6. This unprecedented role of financial markets is not surprising as Drucker had argued that capital
is the main agent of economic integration. See Peter F. Drucker, The ChangedWorld Economy, 64 FOREIGN
AFF., 768 (1986).
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By the international financial structure we mean the system
by which in a market-based economy, credit is created,
bought, and sold and by which, therefore, the use of capital is
determined. This is not to be confused with the international
monetary system which is usually understood to mean the
system that governs exchange rate parities .... It is in the
international financial structure that change in the past two
decades has proceeded fastest, away from nationally-centred
[sic] credit systems toward a single system of integrated
financial markets.7
There is unprecedented growth in the volume of financial transactions.
More than ever before, financial markets are playing important roles in
allocating resources within and across firms. Consider the following trends:
I

The stock of international bank lending (cross-border
lending plus domestic lending denominated in foreign
currency) rose from 4 percent of the combined Gross
National Product (GNP) of the OECD" countries in 1980
to 44 percent in 1990;
As early as 1992, the daily turnover of currency markets
was around $900 billion;
In 1994, the market capitalization of stock markets all
over the world totaled about $15 trillion, more than 2.5
times the GNP of the United States;
In 1993, the world bond markets held more than $16
trillion of publicly issued debt.'

7. JOHN M. STOPFORD ET AL., RIvAL STATES, RIvAL FIRM 40(1991).
8. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an association of leading
industrialized countries.
9. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK (1995); Robert
Wade, Globalizationand Its Limits, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPrALISM 60 (Suzzane Berger

& Ronald Done eds., 1996).
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Clearly, financial transactions are dwarfing real transactions involving
goods and services. Since most financial flows such as currency trading are
short-term, there are concerns that financial markets will force firms to focus
on short-term perspectives while environmental issues require a long-term
perspective. On this count, globalization may create disincentives for firms
to adopt environmentally sound but expensive policies.
The books under review competently illuminate different aspects of the
globalization-environment discourse. Since the authors of these books
represent different professions-Vogel is a professor of business and public
policy, Esty is a lawyer-bureaucrat, and Schmidheiny and Zorraquin are
industrialists'°-these books carry distinct, though complementary,
professional imprints. The organizing scheme of this essay is as follows.
First, I suggest a typology classifying various kinds of environmental
policies that firms may undertake. Then I briefly summarize the three books
under review, highlighting their main themes, conclusions, and
recommendations. Finally, I present my conclusions and identify areas in
need of more research.
I. INCENTIVES FOR GREEN POLICIES
Profit-maximizing firms internalize benefits and externalize those costs
they do not have to bear voluntarily. They internalize such costs or negative
externalities only if required to do so by laws and regulations. Even these
firms can be predicted to compare the expected costs of breaking laws (a
product of penalties for violations and the probability of being caught) with
the expected gains from externalizing such costs. If the expected costs
exceed the expected gains, firms are predicted to comply with laws and
regulations."
Laws and regulations therefore create incentives for

10. Schmidheiny and Zorraquin are members of the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD), which consists of 120 members in 35 countries belonging to more than 20
industrial sectors. The mission of WBCSD is "to provide business leadership as a catalyst for change toward
sustainable development, and to promote eco-efficiency." STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY & FREDERICO J.L.
ZORRAQUIN, WORLD Bus. COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEV., FINANCING CHANGE: THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY,

Eco-EFFICIENCY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT at xv (1996). WBCSD emerged in 1995 through a
merger of Geneva-based Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD) and Paris-based World
Industry Council for the Environment (WICE). BCSD was established in 1990 to represent business
perspective during the 1992 Rio Summit-United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED)-and worked actively with Maurice Strong, the Secretary General of UNCED.
11. In most developed countries, stringent enforcement and stiff civil and criminal penalties tone
down incentives for managers to systemically resist compliance.
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compliance by stipulating harsh penalties for non-compliance.
Governments, through strict enforcement, can increase the probability that
violators will be caught and punished. Markets create incentives for firms
to adopt green policies if such policies increase profits. As I discuss
subsequently, firms with environmentally sound policies may have lower
insurance premiums and easier access to credit. However, financial markets
may punish firms if rates-of-return on environmentally sound projects are
below firms' cost-of-capital.
Environmental policies of firms may just meet the requirements of laws
and regulations or may exceed such requirements (beyond-compliance). As
shown in Table 1, based on two attributes-impact on profits and impact on
compliance-we can identify four broad categories of environmental
policies: (a) TYPE 1 (meet profit norms and go beyond-compliance); (b)
TYPE 2 (do not meet profit norms and go beyond-compliance); (c) TYPE
3 (meet profit norms and ensure compliance); and (d) TYPE 4 (do not meet
profit norms and ensure compliance).
Table 1
Categories of Environmental Policies
Impact on

Ensure Compliance

Compliance

Result in BeyondCompliance

Impact on ProfCts
Profits Match or

Exceed the Firm's
Norm

Profits Do Not Match

the Firm'sNorm

TYPE 3
policies required by
law; get implemented
without any
opposition from
financial markets
TYPE 4

profitable policies
required by law; get
implemented without
any opposition from
financial markets

TYPE 1
policies involving
profitable changes;
supported by financial
markets
TYPE 2

policies which are
opposed by financial
markets
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Firms have incentives to implement TYPE 3 and TYPE 4 policies since
they are required by law and there are stiff penalties for non-compliance.
Firms also have incentives to implement TYPE 1 polices since these meet
or exceed the profit norms. Many firms such as 3M, Procter & Gamble, and
Dow have enthusiastically adopted TYPE 1 policies. 2 Such policies enable
firms to capture the "low-hanging fruit"-projects which are potentially
profitable if new organizational policies and structures were to be adopted. 3
The trade-environment debate really pertains to TYPE 2 policies; to what
extent will firms operating in developed countries adopt TYPE 2 policies?
A derivative issue is whether MNCs have incentives to relocate to so-called
pollution-havens and export their outputs back to industrialized countries.
If so, then one expects that to attract MNCs, developing countries will
progressively lower their environmental standards ("regulatory arbitrage,"
as Cerny 4 puts it) and eventually undermine environmental standards in the
industrialized world. 5 On this count, free trade/investment regimes create
disincentives for firms to adopt TYPE 2 policies in the industrialized world.
The policy prescription then is to construct new regimes and institutions to
restrict exports from and investment in such alleged pollution-havens.
II. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: IS THERE A CONFLICT?
David Vogel's book Trading Up examines the relationship between trade
and environmental regulations, given the extensive linkages between the

12. There is a veritable cottage industry on this topic. For example, see ROGENE A. BUCHOLZ,
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT:
THE GREENING OF BUSINESS (1993); FRANCES
CAIRNCROSS, GREEN, INC.: A GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995); CURTIS MOORE & ALAN
MILLER, GREEN GOLD: JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THE RACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

(1994); ANN RAPPAPORT & MARGARET F. FLAHERTY, CORPORATE RESPONSE TO
(1992); BRUCE SMART, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUSTRY VIEW OF
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); Stuart L. Hart, A Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm, 20 ACAD. OF
MGMT. REV. 986 (1995); Christopher B. Hunt & Ellen R. Auster, Proactive Environmental Management:
Avoiding the Toxic Trap, 32 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7 (1990); Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy,
256 SCI. AM. 168 (1991); Paul Shrivastava, The Role of Corporations in Achieving Ecological
Sustainability, 20 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 936 (1995).
13. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the EnvironmentalCompetitiveness Relationship, 9 J.ECON. PERSP., Fall 1995, at 97.
14. Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT'L ORG. 595,
610 (1995).
15. See Herman E. Daly, Problems with Free Trade: Neoclassical and Steady-State Perspectives,
in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 147, 156 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT].
TECHNOLOGY

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
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making of trade and regulatory policies. 6 Vogel focuses on three themes.
First, that the steady growth of domestic health, safety, and environmental
regulations, along with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's
(GATT) 7 efforts at reducing tariff barriers, has increased the relative
importance of protective regulations as non-tariff barriers. Second, the
making of environmental and consumer regulations is no longer in the
exclusive realm of domestic politics; it is increasingly being shaped by
global influences. Along with products and FDI, countries are exporting
their rules and standards. Third, non-business actors, such as environmental
groups, have become important players in shaping trade policies.
Interestingly, it is not uncommon to find an alliance of protectionist
manufacturers and environmental groups pushing for import restrictions.
Vogel has organized this book around discussions of key regional and
global trade treaties, evaluating them for their impacts on domestic
regulations and their potential misuses as non-tariff barriers. The first three
chapters examine the European Union's (EU) experience in harmonizing
trade with environmental and food safety concerns. Chapters four and five
focus on GATT, providing extensive discussions on the tuna-dolphin case,
and the use of the Standard Code established in the Tokyo Round as a trade
barrier. Chapters seven and eight examine the politics of environmental
policy making in the United States. Vogel discusses the impact of the
"baptist-bootlegger" coalition--alliances of protectionist producers and
environmental groups-on the trade-environment debate. He then examines
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), between the United States and Canada,
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which also
included Mexico. He suggests these agreements have not weakened
Canadian or American standards; they are likely to strengthen Mexican
regulatory standards. The concluding chapter examines conditions for
making free trade and stringent environmental standards mutually
reinforcing.

16. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1995) [hereinafter VOGEL, TRADING UP]. Vogel is a well-known scholar of the politics of

environmental regulation. His previous work, National Styles of Regulation, traced different regulatory
styles in the United States and the United Kingdom to different patterns of historical evolution of businessgovernment relations in the two countries. See generally DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986)

[hereinafter VOGEL,

NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION].

17. VOGEL, TRADING UP, supra note 16 at 3. Now called the World Trade Organization (WTO). See
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Vogel sums up the trade-environment conflict in the following way:
Free trade advocates want to limit the use of regulations as
barriers to trade, while environmentalists and consumer
advocates want to prevent trade agreements from serving as
barriers to regulation. While the trade community worries
about an upsurge of "eco-protection ism"--the justification of
trade barriers on environmental grounds-consumer and
environmental organizations fear that trade liberalization will
weaken both their own country's regulatory standards and
those of their nation's trading partners."s
Will trade liberalization weaken environmental regulations? Vogel thinks
the answer is no. According to Vogel, the impact of trade liberalization on
domestic regulations depends on the preferences of wealthy trading partners
and the degree of economic integration among the trading partners. Thus the
relative salience of the Delaware Effect (the race-to-the-bottom)' 9 and the
California Effect (race-to-the-top) depends on the stringency of
environmental standards of the dominant trading partners. He identifies the
critical role of Germany, the wealthiest of all European countries, in
"greening" the EU. Similarly, in the United States, California's huge
economy creates incentives for firms supplying the United States market to
follow California's stringent environmental regulations.
The impact of trade liberalization on environmental regulations critically
depends on the degree of integration among trading countries--the closer the
economic integration, the greater the leverage enjoyed by wealthy green
countries in encouraging other countries to adopt their green laws and
regulations. Hence, tighter integration among EU countries enables
Germany to defacto impose its standards on the rest of the EU. In contrast,
the weak economic integration among the GATT signatories reduces the
United States' leverage on other GATT members.
Vogel's optimism regarding the positive impact of trade liberalization on
environmental sustainability needs to be tempered with three caveats. First,

18. Id
19. See id. In the United States, corporate charters are given by individual states and all states
mutually recognize each other's charters. This creates incentives for states to progressively lower their
chartering requirements (race-to-the-bottom) with Delaware's chartering requirements being most liberal.
Id. at 5.
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as discussed before, the greening of firms is only an initial step towards
environmental sustainability. As Daly argues, there may be a need to
identify an upper limit to aggregate economic activity; economic growth
does not monotonically support environmental sustainability.2
Second,
Vogel focuses on firms' incentives for adopting TYPE 2 product standards."
He does not tell us anything about incentives for adopting TYPE 2 process
standards. Lax process standards can coexist with stringent product
standards. Some scholars argue that non-uniform process standards create
incentives for firms to migrate to so-called pollution-havens." Third, East
Asia and China lead other regions in economic growth. Since many of these
countries, particularly China, have less stringent environmental laws than the
industrialized countries, the likelihood of Vogel's California Effect is
doubtful in this increasingly important region.
III. GREENING THE GATT
Vogel identifies incentives for firms to adopt TYPE 2 product standards.
The next question is how should firms be encouraged to adopt TYPE 2
process standards? Esty's Greening the GATT illuminates this issue by
drawing insights from U.S. environmental policymaking as well as
international environmental diplomacy.23 He notes that:
In an ecologically interdependent world, each country's right
to decide for itself how to exploit the natural resources within

20. See Herman E. Daly, Allocation, Distribution,andScale: Towards an Economics that is Efficient,
Just, andSustainable,6 ECOLOGICAL ECON., Oct. 1992, at 185.
21. VOGEL, TRADING UP, supra note 16. GATT/WTO distinguishes between process and product
standards and allows only the latter. Process standards pertain to the manner in which products are
manufactured. Product standards regulate properties of products and how products may be consumed and
disposed of. Process standards, in contrast, specify production technologies and impede countries from
manufacturing and trading based on their respective comparative advantages. GATT/WTO disallows import
tariffs or other restrictions intended to harmonize differences in process standards across countries since its
mandate is promoting free trade. For free trade to flourish, firms must have autonomy in choosing their
production technologies. Since product standards do not clash with the logic of comparative advantage,
they are compatible with GATT/WTO. Id. at 112.
22. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supranote 15.

23. See DANIEL L. EsTy, GREENING THE GATT (1994). Esty has served as the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, and
Evaluation; EPA's Deputy Chief of Staff; and Special Assistant to EPA Administrator William Reilly. He
was also EPA's chief NAFTA negotiator.
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its borders and how much waste to dump into the air, water,
or onto the land must be reconciled with the environmental
needs of others in the shared ecosystem and the global
aspiration for sustainable economic growth.24
He argues that current environmental policies do not meet the above
objectives for two broad reasons. First, there is an economic failure to
adequately internalize environmental costs, which results in making
consumers and producers pay the full price for the environmental harm they
cause. Second, there is a political failure to override special interests and
adopt cost-internalization policies that protect the environment while
encouraging trade.
Esty has organized this book into ten chapters. In chapters one and two,
Esty examines the trends in trade and environmental policies and how they
have impacted each other. He identifies four core propositions of
environmentalists relating to trade: (a) since trade promotes economic
growth, it undermines environmental sustainability; (b) trade liberalization
undermines environmental regulations; (c) trade restrictions are legitimate
tools for addressing transboundary and global environmental problems; and
(d) firms operating in countries with lax environmental standards have a
competitive advantage over firms operating in countries with stringent
standards. In chapter three, Esty discusses the internalization of externalities
argument as the economic basis for resolving trade-environment disputes.
In chapter four, he lays out the raison d'etre for a Global Environmental
Organization (GEO). In chapters five and six, he identifies trade measures
to achieve environmental objectives and provides an interesting discussion
on the use of "swords" (sanctions to address environmental harms outside
one's borders) versus "shields" (defensive measures to address
environmental harms within one's borders). He then lays out conditions for
employing "swords" and "shields" to achieve environmental objectives. In
chapter seven, Esty focuses on the environment-competitiveness
relationship, noting that current discourses focus on pollution control
expenditures while ignoring more critical factors such as energy prices.
Chapter eight adds the North-South dimension to the trade-environment
debate and discusses how the North can employ both "carrots" and "sticks"
in creating incentives for the South to participate in global environmental

24. Id. at 225-26.
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agreements. In chapters nine and ten, Esty provides a blueprint for making
the GATT more sensitive to environmental concerns by addressing political
and economic failures of current policymaking. Esty also provides five
excellent appendices on the history of the GATT, measuring levels of
restrictiveness of trade measures, key trade-environment cases, international
environmental agreements with trade measures, and a matrix of appropriate
unilateral trade measures for meeting environmental objectives.
Overall, Esty recommends two broad strategies for harmonizing trade and
environmental objectives. First, Esty suggests enacting environmental
regulations based on the "polluter pays principle"--polluters paying the costs
of internalizing environmental externalities. Second, Esty recommends
creating a GEO to ensure that environmental concerns remain on an equal
footing with trade issues. He views no existing international organization
as having the resources or the mandate to organize global environmental
efforts. The proposed GEO meets this objective by acting as a bulwark
against domestic pressures which undermine long-term approaches to
environmental policies. Though he recognizes that cost internalization may
be achieved without creating another international institution, he feels that
the politics of competitiveness makes this task difficult. Hence, for Esty,
a GEO is a political response to environmental issues.
Though Esty's arguments are interesting, creating yet another
international bureaucracy may be extremely difficult, if not undesirable.
There is a strong anti-United Nations sentiment in the United States right
now, which I suspect, will be asked to pay the bulk of the costs of running
the GEO. I think, Esty's suggestion is politically infeasible; focusing on
upgrading the mandate and resources of an existing organization such as the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) may be more practicable.
Esty does not consider UNEP fit for this role since its mandate is narrow, its
budget small, and its staffing inadequate. Further, UNEP is locationally
disadvantaged by being headquartered in Nairobi where inadequate
communication infrastructure and poor quality of life make it difficult to
attract first-rate staffers. I think it is much easier to fix these alleged
problems than to create a new international organization.
IV. FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

Globalization is marked by internationalization of financial markets and
the dwarfing of real flows by financial flows. With active transnational
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mergers and acquisitions (M & A) markets, managers seek to tailor their
firms' policies to keep financial markets in good humor.25 In many firms,
the compensation of top executives is linked to the share price of the
company's stock (deferred payment compensation). Hence, managers in
firms have incentives to pay close attention to how financial markets are
evaluating their company's performance. As Schmidheiny and Zorraquin
note, these trends raise the following questions:
Do the financial markets encourage a short-termist, profitsonly mentality that ignores much human and environmental
reality? Or are they simply tools that reflect human concerns,
and so will eventually reflect disquiet over poverty and the
degradation of nature by rewarding companies that treat
people and the environment in a responsible manner?26
To answer these questions, the two authors examine the workings of
financial markets and the roles of various financial players. They identify
incentives for different players to send positive as well as negative signals
to firms adopting TYPE 2 process standards. Hence, the evidence is mixed
on whether financial markets encourage or discourage the greening of firms.
The authors have organized this book into nine chapters. In chapters one
and two, they lay out the broad canvas of how financial markets may impact
environmental sustainability. They identify seven propositions on the
impacts of financial markets' eco-efficiency, which denotes both economic
and ecological efficiency at the firm level. These propositions are as
follows:
"

Sustainable development requires investment with long
payback. Financial markets seek short-term payback;
Green policies reduce present earnings in favor of future
earnings.
Financial markets reward high present
earnings;

25. The value of all M & A transactions in 1995 amounted to $229 billion, double the 1988 levels.
For details, see U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996; INVESTMENT,TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS, at xiv, U.N. Sales No. E.96.11.A. 14 (1996).

26. SCHM1DHEINY & ZORRAQUN, supra note 10, at xxi.
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Given low prices of natural resources and the possibilities
of externalizing environmental costs, financial markets
will punish firms investing in green policies;
Sustainable development requires massive investment in
developing countries. However, due to political risks in
such countries, financial markets put high risk premia and
thereby discourage such investments;
High taxes on personal income coupled with low resource
prices, create incentives for resource intensive and not
labor intensive technologies.
This harms the
environment;
The current accounting standards do not adequately
report potential environmental risks/benefits.
Since
financial markets judge firms on the basis of such
standards, their assessment of environment risks/benefits
is biased;
Sustainable development emphasizes the future; financial
markets discount it.
The authors then discuss the environmental consequence of increasing
private financial flows to emerging economies. In chapters three through
eight, the authors focus on specific financial actors: company leaders,
investors and analysts, bankers, insurers, accountants, and raters. The
authors identify incentives as well as disincentives for such actors to reward
firms pursuing TYPE 2 policies and offer suggestions on how these actors
can be encouraged to take greater cognizance of environmental implications
of economic actions of firms. For example, U.S. courts hold banks liable for
contaminated land held by them as surety. This creates incentives for
bankers to carefully scrutinize their borrowers' environmental policies.
Similarly, since the increasing concentration of the greenhouse gases may
influence the frequency and predictability of natural disasters, the insurance
industry may have incentives to lobby for capping emissions of greenhouse
gases. Finally, in chapter nine, the authors present their conclusions by
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summarizing empirical evidence relating to the seven propositions listed
above.
This book is important for two reasons. First, it focuses attention on a
key, though neglected, aspect of firms' behavior--their relationship with
financial markets in the context of making environmental policies. Along
with highlighting the inadequacies of the current financial systems in
supporting the greening of firms, the authors suggest solutions and examine
the challenges in implementing them. Second, the authors are well known
industrial leaders with extensive knowledge of the working of firms as well
as financial markets. This factor contributes to the credibility of their
analysis. I view this book as a continuation of the larger project initiated by
Schmidheiny's previous book-Changing Course," in which an effort was
made to identify how economic and environmental agendas can be
harmonized. This is a far tougher option than the usual academic pastime
of damning the corporate sector.
CONCLUSION

MNCs are often viewed as preeminent agents of environmental
degradation.28 One reason may be the predominance of MNCs in pollutionintensive extractive industries. Also, industrial accidents such as the Bhopal
disaster have reinforced the perception that MNCs have little concern for
environmental issues. Populist politicians, as evidenced during the recent
U.S. presidential campaign, also create a specter of MNCs laying off
workers in industrialized countries and relocating to so-called pollutionhavens. Numerous empirical studies, however, demonstrate an absence of
systemic trends suggesting that MNCs have relocated to so-called pollutionhavens.29 This is attributed to the low proportion of pollution-abatement
costs in relation to total costs for most (though not all) industries and the
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high costs of relocating."
FDI trends confirm this conclusion since
developed countries, with comparably stringent environmental laws, are the
major recipients of FDI-in 1994 they accounted for 65 percent of the FDI
inflows.3' Further, it can also be argued that, in some cases, since MNCs are
beneficiaries of stringent process standards, they may lobby for them. 2
Hence, we cannot claim a priori that globalization supports or impedes
firms' propensities in adopting TYPE 2 policies on product and process
standards. An understanding of the politics of trade liberalization, financial
integration, and environmental regulations is important. Vogel's book is an
outstanding contribution on this count in that it outlines conditions
(preferences of wealthy countries on environmental issues and the degree of
economic integration among trading partners) influencing how trade
liberalization may create incentives for the adoption of stringent TYPE 2
product standards. Esty's book furthers our understanding of collective
action dilemmas in implementing TYPE 2 process standards, and the urgent
need for reforming the GATT/WTO if we are not to have another
international organization dealing with environmental issues. Schmidheiny
and Zorraquin's volume competently examines how financial markets may
influence incentives for firms to adopt TYPE 2 policies. Since existing
financial markets may not always reward firms adopting TYPE 2 policies,
Schmidheiny and Zorraquin lay out an agenda for institutional changes such
as creating new accounting standards which reflect environmental costs of
business decisions.
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1995, at 119. Porter and van der Linde argue that investments in environmental projects are profitable since
properly designed environmental regulations encourage innovations which offset increased costs of
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What are the issues in need of more research? First, we need a better
understanding of how increasing levels of multinationalization impact on
MNCs' incentives for adopting TYPE 2 process standards. Though the 1993
UNCTAD34 report suggests that MNCs with sales greater than $4.9 billion
dollars have stronger environmental programs than MNCs with sales less
than $4.9 billion, higher sales may not always translate into higher levels of
multinationalization. A more sophisticated measure of the degree of
globalization is required; probably building on the composite index of
multinationality which combines three attributes of firms: salience of
foreign sales, foreign assets, and foreign workforce in the corresponding
totals. 35 Second, we need to unpack MNCs to understand their internal
decisionmaking on TYPE 2 policies. A given MNC may adopt only some,
and not all, TYPE 2 policies. The research challenge, then, is to specify
conditions, external as well as internal to MNCs, which facilitate the
emergence of TYPE 2 policies. Thus, along with macro sample studies
linking levels of multinationality to greenness of environmental policies,
micro firm level studies are required. This will require academics to closely
collaborate with business managers; the payoff being the strengthening
empirical bases of our understanding of links between globalization and
environmental sustainability.

34. U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS;
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